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Evaluation of occupied buildings for accidental explosion hazards at petrochemical facilities is a 
vital part of a process safety program and is a key element of facility siting.  In some cases, 
buildings may be screened out prior to performing structural blast evaluations due to minimal 
exposure to blast loading.  Defining a minimum blast load in which a specific type of building may 
be screened without structural assessment is left to the owners or their engineering consultants.  
Determining when a structural assessment for blast hazards is necessary is a critical safety 
decision.   
 
Currently, API-752 does not include a blast load value that can be used for screening out building 
types without the requirement for structural assessment.  Other publications provide pressure-
based benchmarks for screening either for buildings in general or for specific types of buildings.  
This paper reviews industry guidance and makes recommendations for building blast-screening 
for consideration in the next revision of API-752. 
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1 Introduction 
Ensuring protection of personnel in the event of an accidental explosion is paramount in a blast 
hazards assessment. Physiologically, humans can withstand higher blast pressures (e.g. 99% 
survivability with overpressure < ~1.9 Bar and threshold of eardrum damage ~5 psi [1]) than many 
structures. Pressure in these range can cause significant structural damage to conventionally 
constructed buildings resulting in severe injuries and fatalities due to structural failure and debris. 
Thus, evaluation of occupied buildings for accidental explosion hazards at petrochemical facilities 
is a vital part of a process safety program and is a key element of facility siting.  
There are three traditional methods of evaluating of buildings for blast hazards; detailed finite 
element analysis (FEA), basic dynamics (single and multi-degree of freedom systems), and 
screening based on blast loads. Building screening is sometimes applied and performed by defining 
a minimum blast load in which a specific type of building(s) may be considered adequate for 
personnel protection prior to performing structural blast evaluations due to minimal exposure to 
blast loading. Screening policy and definition of acceptable blast load criteria are left to the owners 
or their engineering consultants to perform. 
Various industries and government agencies have provided varying levels of regulatory 
requirements, recommended practices, guidance documents and minimum standards regarding 
blast evaluation of buildings and screening limits.   
American Petroleum, Institute (API) API-752 [2] is a recommended practice for accidental 
explosions in the industrial facilities.  Currently, API-752 does not include a blast load value that 
can be used for screening out building types without the requirement for structural assessment. 
Other publications provide pressure-based benchmarks for screening either buildings in general or 
for specific types of buildings. This paper reviews industry guidance, examines difficulties and 
challenges for screening evaluations, and makes recommendations for building blast-screening for 
consideration in the next revision of API-752. 
2 Building Screening for Blast Hazards 
Screening level analysis is intended to establish the adequacy of a building to perform at or better 
than a specific level of response without performing structural calculations.  In most cases, a blast 
pressure value is referenced in which a building would be expected to sustain a particular level of 
damage. If blast loads on the building are predicted to be at or lower than the screening value no 
additional structural analyses are necessary, and the building is considered adequate to withstand 
structural failure hazards.  Non-structural hazard screening criteria (e.g., window fragments, 
falling overhead lights, overturning equipment racks) may still require assessment and are not 
addressed by this paper.  Some screening values for window glass hazards are mentioned below, 
but the focus of the paper is structural failure hazards. 
Establishing screening criteria has been accomplished in many ways. Historical references and 
industry guides often provide and update screening values for blast hazards. Subject matter experts 
with extensive experience with structures subjected to blasts have provided information, data, and 
methods for screening structural systems for blast response. Collection and comparison of damage 
to buildings affected by accidental explosion is also highly relied upon to set screening levels. 
Finally, research and blast testing are used to establish, refine, and supplement screening criteria.  
Screening criteria have often been established based upon construction type (e.g. masonry 
buildings, pre-engineered metal buildings, light weight wood trailers, etc.). In an effort to simplify 
screening and evaluations, a single pressure value is often sought after that could be applied to 
many types of buildings in a “one size fits all” approach. It should also be pointed out that 
screening criteria does not typically directly address occupant vulnerability which is a primary 
intent of blast hazard assessment. 
Diligent care must be used in order to apply screening criteria properly. A clear understanding of 
the background of the established screening criteria being used is critical. The industry that the 
criteria was intended for can dictate the type of blast loads that the information is applicable. For 
example, criteria established for Department of Defense use would likely assume highly energetic 
materials and explosives which tend to result in higher pressure shorter duration blast loads. While 
industrial facilities criteria such a refineries and chemical plants are more likely to criteria based 
on vapor cloud explosions (VCEs) with lower pressure and longer duration blast waves. It should 
be known whether the screen values are based on overpressure or free-field blast loading of applied 
loads to surfaces of a building. It is common to reference screening criteria based on pressure 
values alone. In such cases, criterion must be based on long duration blast loads such as those from 
VCEs (hundreds of milliseconds). However, guides and documents often do not always reference 
the type of explosion or assumed blast duration and present only a pressure value as it relates to a 
building damage. 
3 Published Criteria 
A sampling of published screening criteria in a variety of sources was reviewed and included 
documents and references from institutes and associations related to oil, gas, and chemical 
industries, government agencies, Department of Defense, and international standards. 
3.1 API-752 
API-752 and API-753[3] are two of the most recognized documents for recommended practices in 
the blast hazard evaluation in oil, gas, and chemical processing industries. Table 4 of the 1st [4] and 
2nd [5] editions of the API-752 document includes of free-field overpressure values with 
consequences for various building types (a copy is shown below in Table 1). The document states 
“In a consequence analysis, it may be assumed that building occupants could incur injuries if the 
integrity of the building is exceeded.”.  
Table 1. Overpressure and Consequences on Various Building Types (1st and 2nd Edition of 
API-752) 
 
For the 5 building types included the minimum overpressure listed with a building damage 
consequence ranged from 1 psi to 1.5 psi. This may give the impression that buildings can be 
screened for blast damage hazards at about 1 psi. The values were given based on nuclear weapons 
testing prior to 1964 indicating very long duration blast loads. 
Both the 1st and 2nd Editions of API-752 also included pressure effects on various building 
components (shown in Table 2) based on loads applied as reflected pressures. Assuming a 
reflection factor of about 2.0 for lower pressures the following values for selected common 
building components would result the following: 
 0.25-0.5 psi (20-35 mbar) Glass shattering with hazardous velocities 
 0.5-1.5 psi (35-100 mbar) Metal/Cemesto/Brick Cladding 
 0.5-1.5 psi (35-100 mbar) URM wall collapse, possible shattering 
Table 2. Overpressure and Effects on Various Building Components (1st and 2nd Edition of 
API-752) 
 
As mentioned, Table 1 utilizes free-field overpressure and Table 2 utilizes reflected overpressure.  
It is important to know which is being used when relying on any source for pressure-based 
screening. 
The most recent version of the API-752 document (3rd Edition) does not include any pressure to 
building or component damage related information.  Rather, it promotes the use of updated 
technology for prediction of blast damage to buildings, determination of occupant vulnerabilities, 
and estimates of event frequencies.  It also points the evaluators toward building damage level 
assessments using tools such as charts (or software that automate use of charts) that have been 
developed based on the assessment of representative buildings or detailed structural analysis. 
Tables listing the lowest overpressures from the charts that cause specific damage levels (pressure 
asymptotes) may also be used. 
3.2 API 753 
API-753 was written to specifically address process plant portable buildings.  Table 2 of the 
document (included in Table 3 below) contains upper bound free-field pressure values two damage 
level descriptions for lightweight  wood trailers. These are generally considered the weakest 
constructed portable building used in the processing industries. The establishment of the upper 
bound pressures was based on FEA modeling and compared with empirical damage observed at 
accident sites involving vapor cloud explosions. The lower limit value of 0.6 psi is regularly used 
to site temporary light wood trailers for low vulnerability to occupants.  Some companies that are 
less risk-adverse use the 0.9 psi value. 
Table 3. Upper Bound Pressure V Damage Level for Lightweight Wood Trailers 
 
 
3.3 Chemical Industries Association UK 
In the United Kingdom, the Chemical Industries Association’s (CIA) presents a benchmark value 
for overpressure and damage threshold for buildings in the 3rd Edition of “Guidance for the location 
and design of occupied buildings on chemical manufacturing sites” [6]. Table 4.1 of the CIA 
guidance (shown in Table 4) cites a value of 0.4 psi (30 mbar) below which overpressure are 
insufficient to cause structural damage or significant glass hazards. The guide states “Where 
hazard criteria are not exceeded no specific building design features or upgrades are required.”  
Therefore, the overpressure value is intended as encompassing screening value. Reviewing the 
source [7] for this value illustrates that it is a lower bound selected from a listing of a variety of 
construction components and qualitative damage descriptions over a range of overpressures.  
Although not explicitly noted, it is presumed that the 0.4 psi is based on free-field overpressure at 
the building location. 
 




3.4 TNO “Green Book” 
Another international source, often referred to as the “TNO Green Book”[8], has been commonly 
used for building damage estimation based on tables of overpressures and damage descriptions. 
From a sampling of these tables, shown in Table 5, it is seen that in the pressure range of 1 to 2 
psi damage is described as Minor to Moderate, partial roof collapse and 25% wall failure, and 
walls of concrete block have collapsed. Glass hazards are also noted at 0.4 psi (3kPa) with 50% of 
all window panes will be broken. 




3.5 HUD and EPA-RMP 
Two government agency documents include minimum pressure values for blast hazards on 
structures in which mitigation is not required. The U.S. Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The HUD guidebook[9], “Siting of HUD-assisted 
Projects near Hazardous Facilities (HUD-1060-CPD, Sept. 1996)” provides the technical 
guidelines to determine acceptable separation distances.  It indicates a minimum pressure of 0.5 
psi is acceptable based on the statement in the document. “Research conducted by military services 
indicated that 0.5 psi is an acceptable level of blast overpressure for both people and buildings. 
At this level, people will probably not be injured (especially if located inside a building) and no 
major structural damage will result to buildings, with the exception of broken windows.” 
The EPA requires facilities which store or produce hazardous materials at various minimum 
quantities to have a Risk Management Plan (RMP). EPA has prepared a separate document, RMP 
Offsite Consequence Analysis Guidance[10], which provides simple methods and reference tables 
for determining distance to an endpoint for worst-case and alternative release scenarios. 
In the document, a 1.0 psi overpressure is given for acceptable exposure for offsite structures. It 
does not exclude the possibility of severe injuries or death.  It does qualify its guidance with the 
following: “this overpressure may cause property damage such as partial demolition of houses, 
which can result in injuries to people, and shattering of glass windows, which may cause skin 
laceration from flying glass”. 
 
3.6 High Explosive Related Regulations  
Department of Defense (DoD) Explosives Safety Manual 6055.9 [11] contains published maximum 
overpressure exposure limits for inhabited building and public property lines. This document 
requires that without detailed analysis inhabited buildings may not be exposed to more than1.2 psi 
and 0.9 psi for small explosion and large explosions, respectively.  Above these thresholds 
mitigation measures are required or detailed analysis is needed to show structural damage is 
limited to acceptable levels. 
NATO’s AASTP-1[12] is a similar document to the DoD 6055.9. In the AASTP-1, 0.72 psi (50 
mbar) is given as the limit for exposure for inhabited buildings. This is reduced to 0.3 psi (20 mbar) 
for high importance buildings (e.g. schools, hospitals, and glass clad buildings). The 0.72 psi limit 
is qualified with, “The distances are intended to prevent serious structural damage by blast, flame 
or projections to ordinary types of inhabited buildings (23 cm brick or equivalent) or caravans 
and consequent death or serious injuries to their occupants.” It is further added that the limits are 
“not sufficiently large to prevent breakage of glass and other frangible panels or cladding used in 
… buildings of vulnerable construction.”. 
3.7 American Society of Civil Engineers  
The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) “Design of Blast Resistant Buildings in 
Petrochemical Facilities” [13] was written with a specific audience of design engineers supported 
the petrochemical industry.  It includes recommendations and methodologies for development of 
blast loads, dynamic analysis of structures, responses criteria, and damage limits specifically 
related to hazards associated with petrochemical facilities.  While focused on design, the document 
does address siting buildings, designed for conventional loads only, at an overpressure of 1 psi or 
less.  It goes on to state that “…unstrengthened buildings can sustain damage less than five percent 
of the replacement cost and personnel are provided a high degree of protection from death or 
serious injury.” The basis selection of this value is provisions of DoD 6055.9 limits for inhabited 
buildings (see Section 3.6 for discussion of DoD 6055.9).  It should be noted that the ASCE 
committee is currently considering a reduction of this over pressure in future editions of the guide. 
As can be seen from the sampling of literature regarding blast hazard assessments on building, 
there is a range of minimum values that are presented or may be interpreted as overpressure 
screening data.  A summary of those examined here is shown in Table 6.  
Table 6.  Summary of Building “Screening” Values 




API 752 2nd Edition (2003)1 
Glass shattering with hazardous velocities 0.25 - 0.5 
Metal/Cemesto/Brick Cladding 0.5 - 1.5 
URM wall collapse, possible shattering 0.5 - 1.5 
API 753 
Level 2A Damage 0.6 
Level 2B Damage 0.9 
Chemical Industries 
Association 
No structural damage or significant glass 
hazard 
0.44 
TNO Green Book 
Minor to Moderate Damage 
Partial roof collapse and 25% wall failure 
1 - 2 
HUD 
No major structural damage with the 
exception of broken windows. Low 
probability of injury. 
0.5 
EPA-RMP 
Partial demolition of houses, shattering of 
glass windows 
Some injuries to people and possible skin 
laceration from flying glass 
1.0 
DoD 6055.9  
Inhabited Buildings and Property 
Boundaries – small explosions 
1.2 
Inhabited Buildings and Property 
Boundaries – small explosions 
0.9 




NATO  AASTP-1 
Schools, hospitals, and glass clad 
buildings 
0.3 
Ordinary inhabited buildings 
Prevent serious structural damage by blast, 
flame or projections to ordinary buildings 
and consequent death or serious injuries to 
their occupants.” 
0.72 
ASCE – Design of Blast-
Resistant Buildings in 
Petrochemical Facilities 
Based on DoD 6055.9 
Unstrengthened buildings can sustain 
damage less than five percent of the 
replacement cost and personnel are 
provided a high degree of protection from 
death or serious injury 
1.02 
13rd Edition removed the values and no new minimums were established 
2Committee currently considering a reduction in this value 
 
 
4 Reasons for Caution 
Selection of a single value for screening buildings of different construction is without a doubt 
challenging. Determination of a screening overpressure for a single type of construction can also 
be difficult. Two buildings with the same basic construction can have significantly different load 
carrying capacities due to differences in details and intended structural response.   
Lack of ductility in a structural component dramatically reduces its blast resistance and allowable 
response levels. As an example, a common construction type in many facilities utilizes concrete 
masonry units (CMU) or block walls. In locations with very low or no seismic loading 
requirements, many CMU walls were constructed without steel reinforcement for out of plane 
loads. A comparison of applied pressure and impulse capacities of unreinforced CMU walls with 
a similar wall with minimal reinforcement included is illustrated in the Figure 1.  Figure 1 is a 
traditional Pressure-impulse (P-i) diagram. These P-i diagrams are for applied loading as are all of 
the diagrams shown in the paper. As can be seen in the diagrams, the minimal amount of 
reinforcement more than doubles its pressure asymptote. For a building evaluator, the visual 
difference between these two walls can be negligible. It is stressed that these diagrams are applied 
loads to the wall surface; hence, if the wall is facing the blast a reflection factor would apply to the 
loading. 
  
Figure 1. P-I Diagram for Unreinforced and Minimally Reinforced CMU Wall 
 
Another common structural item which can have large differences in blast capacity with seemingly 
little differences in construction are open web steel joists (OWSJ). When designed for 
conventional loading, the OWSJ is a very efficient load transferring element. Depending on the 
design, the load carrying limits may be shear or flexure controlled. A shear-controlled joist will 
over load its web bracing axially when pushed beyond its full ultimate capacity. Buckling of the 
bracing ensues and the joist loses its geometric section and load carrying ability rapidly. A flexural-
controlled joist will yield in its tension chord first allowing for some limited plastic deformation 
and energy absorption prior to failure.  A comparison of P-i diagrams for shear-controlled and 
flexural-controlled OWSJ is shown in Figure 2.  Again, the pressure capacity increases by a about 
a factor of 2.   
 
  
Figure 2. P-I Diagram for Shear and Flexural Controlled OWSJ 
 
Connection detailing in a pre-engineered metal buildings can also make a considerable difference 
in blast capacity.  For a cold-formed girt constructed with a bypass connection (continuous over 
the outside flange of a column) can exhibit an applied load pressure asymptote about twice the 
magnitude versus a simply connected member spanning between the columns as seen in Figure 3. 
Both members are ductile responding and it is the change in support condition for the bypass 
connection that increases the capacity. 
 
  
Figure 3. P-I Diagram for Shear and Flexural Controlled OWSJ 
 
Even seemingly robust structural members may have lower blast capacities than intuitively 
thought. Precast reinforced concrete can have substantial blast resistance due to its strength and 
mass.  However, connections for these members may not always be capable of resisting large 
reaction associated with a large blast rating. Some of these are intended to only hold members in 
place and the member itself either bears on another member or connection pocket with gravity 
being the primary uplift resistance. 
Blast capacity rating differences should be identified and addressed before a screening process can 
be performed to evaluate the building for blast load hazards. 
5 Summary and Recommendations 
Building screening based on a single pressure value can be an attractive and efficient tool for rapid 
evaluation of blast hazards.  The evaluator or screener should be careful to ensure that screening 
criteria is properly applied. A clear understanding of the background, industry, and even specific 
building construction are critical to using an established screening criterion. 
A sampling of industry documents and guides demonstrates a broad range of minimal pressure 
values and damage relationships under which buildings can be considered “safe” or “screened” 
without further evaluation. This range, of as low as 0.3 psi to as high as 2.0 psi, complicates the 
ability to select a single value for screening. A rule of thumb of 1.0 psi for building screening has 
been used in some instances and would appear to be too high to cover the wide range of 
constructions. 
Considerable conservatism is required to select a single value pressure for building screening. This 
being the case, it is likely that low value must be selected.  A conservative value may be so low 
that only a few buildings will be screened out and further analysis will be required. Essentially, 
making the screening process ineffective. 
The end goal of building evaluation in facility siting processes is typically to determine the risk to 
occupants. Many of the values presented do not address occupant vulnerability associated with 
them.  
As the API committees move forward to the next editions of recommended practices, the following 
recommendations are presented for consideration: 
 Clearly discuss if there is a need for a single screening value for all building construction 
types 
 Provide understanding that both pressure and impulse should be considered in screening 
and distinguish between reflected loads and free-field loads in any tables or curves. 
 Evaluate and address variability of screening values on similar construction and the need 
to fully understand considerations such as reinforcement ratios, shear controlled situations, 
and quality of connections. 
 Consider the effectiveness of the screening process for proposed values 
 Assess and include occupant vulnerability levels associated with any screening pressure or 
impulses proposed 
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